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I
INTRODUCTION
Commentaries have generally overlooked the following properties of
police discretion: 1) it is required by accountability; 2) it consists of unex-
plained variation in police decisions; 3) it does not contribute to the over-
whelming class bias in policing; 4) it is increased by the imposition of laws,
regulations, and rules; and 5) its creation is necessary for reducing the injus-
tice of policing.
Accountability requires discretion. If society aims to use regulation to
make the police accountable to the citizens they serve, society's rules must not
only channel accountability, but must create discretion. And if society aims to
reduce the level of class bias in law enforcement through accountability, dis-
cretionary rules must be designed to offer an incentive for the police to
engage in aggressive nonenforcement.
These premises for guiding police discretion run counter to Davis's.'
Davis's work is the foundation for much of the contemporary writing on dis-
cretion, especially in legal forums such as Law and Contemporary Problems.2
While Davis is to be praised for focusing scholarly attention on problems of
police accountability and discretion, his premises severely restrict our capacity
to formulate ways to solve those problems.
This article begins from the premise that discretion is a desirable part of
policing. It proposes a system of accountability designed to generate discre-
tion in a way that reduces the injustice of selective law enforcement.
II
ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIRES DISCRETION
The proposition that accountability requires discretion requires no empir-
ical demonstration; it can be deduced from the definitions of the two
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concepts. Accountability means having to answer for one's actions (or inac-
tion). Accountability is thus synonymous with responsibility. Having to
answer for one's actions makes sense only if one could have chosen to do
otherwise. Holding accountable one who had no choice of action would
amount to holding one to answer for a superior's decision; and, even then, it
would entail the premise that the subordinate chose (acted) to allow the supe-
rior to prevail.
Discretion, as Davis pointed out, means choice of action.3 Hence, account-
ability implies discretion. Insofar as Davis is correct that West German prose-
cutors have no discretion-that they merely do as the law dictates4-he
implies that legislators, not prosecutors, are accountable for the practice of
prosecution.
III
RECOGNIZING DISCRETION
Davis's definition of discretion is at once clear, simple, and implausible:
"A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power
leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inac-
tion." 5 Sellin's work from the 1930's suggests a different definition. 6 Then,
as now, it was popular to suppose that law-abiding behavior is rule governed,
while law-violating behavior is not. Sellin proposed instead that all behavior
is rule governed but that, in the course of approval and disapproval, success
and failure, in everyday life, each person learns a unique set of norms. To
some degree at least, each of us lives in an individual culture bounded by a
unique set of social experience. When, for instance, a suspect is arrested by a
police officer, one can suppose that, in violating the officer's norms, the sus-
pect adhered to norms of his or her own. In this sense, the violation of law
implies a form of culture conflict.
Sellin implies that no actor "is free to make a choice among possible
courses of action or inaction," for adherence to norms is the only possibility.
One need not literally agree with Sellin in order to draw a major insight from
his supposition. Whether public officers have freedom of choice of action (or
inaction) can be presumed to be inherently problematic. Within limits, the
problem is susceptible to empirical resolution. For example, a previous study
conducted by the author of police offense-reporting decisions illustrates false
presumptions of discretion by police.7 Patrol officers seemingly have great
discretion as to whether to file offense reports. Apart from general exhorta-
tions to report fully and fairly, officers are given little formal guidance on such
issues as whether to believe complainants when there are reasons to question
3. K. DAVIS (1969), supra note 1, at 4.
4. Id. at 16 6passim.
5. Id. at 4.
6. J. SELLIN, CULTURE CONFLICT AND CRIME (1938).
7. Pepinsky, Police Patrolmen's Offense-Reporting Behavior, 13 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 33
(1976).
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their veracity or how to interpret "obvious" evidence that gives rise to con-
flicting interpretations of an event (e.g., whether screwdriver marks on a door
indicate that someone intended to commit a felony in a dwelling, or whether
there is some other plausible explanation). Other cues that the police
receive-such as orders to maximize their visibility on the streets-militate
against wasting time on fruitless or trivial reporting and sustain discretion not
to file offense reports. The patrol officers observed in this study were confi-
dent that their decisions were and had to be largely a matter of individual
discretion.
The officers were wrong. Regardless of whether complainants stated
offenses, the officers failed to file a report unless dispatchers had named an
offense in their calls (e.g., "check a burglary" as opposed to "check a break-
in"). When a police dispatcher named an offense in his call to a patrol car,
and a complainant corroborated that some offense (even if a different one)
had occurred, the officers reported offenses ninety percent of the time. A
simple set of decision rules for narrow categories of offenses accounted for
the balance of nonreporting. Apparently, in a quasi-military organization with
a vague mandate, bureaucratic functionaries unconsciously patterned their
behavior to accord with the nearest thing to directives that existed. Did the
officers have discretion in Davis's terms? They had very little, in fact. Their
major discretion appeared to be over which offense to report, not over
whether to report an offense.
Empirically, the inference is that discretion amounts purely and simply to vari-
ance in decisions an observer is unable to explain. This empirical result acknowl-
edges that the existence of discretion rests on the method of the observer.
Other scientists, such as physicists and chemists, have long since conceded
that instruments of measurement are ever capable of confounding empirical
tests of their theories. Thus, it should cause social scientists no great loss of
face to forsake positivism ("the facts speak for themselves") for empirical
realism (theories rest on facts, which in turn rest on the vagaries of measure-
ment). It may well be that today's discretion will, in light of refined measure-
ments of analysis, turn out to be tomorrow's empirical law of human behavior,
by definition a discretionary void. Among those of us who are committed to
expanding the human power of choice-the exercise of free will-it is seldom
recognized that measurement can be designed so as to find greater unex-
plained variance in social action. Knowledge of how groups of people
manage to decrease the predictability of their acts provides a scientific basis
for designing and evaluating strategies of social control that expand rather
than restrict room for human choice. 8 For us students of discretion, then, it is
important to recognize that the existence of discretion rests ultimately on how
we and others look for it and that, as Davis acknowledges, the existence of
discretion may be a blessing. 9
8. Pepinsky, Humanizing Social Control, 6 HUMANITY & Soc'y 227 (1982).
9. K. DAVIS (1969), supra note 1, at 19.
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Some will protest that it is overly behavioral to define discretion as unex-
plained variance. However, the definition precludes the possibility that
groups of people happen to make the same choice under similar circum-
stances. It also precludes the possiblity that people who behave in unex-
pected ways do so without thinking through their action and making any
rational choices. Some thinkers argue that the observer must delve into the
minds of actors to see what rational options they considered.' 0 But this sends
the observer into an infinite regress. Were the patrol officers in my study
reporting their true thought processes? Were they deceiving even themselves
about the choices they made? If they had claimed that they had the option of
reporting offenses when the dispatcher had named none, would they have
been deceiving the observer or themselves-by laying claim to greater power
than they actually had? These issues have no empirical solution. The only
testable propositions about choice rest on what people do, not on what they
or observers claim that they might have done instead. Nor can one test pro-
positions about whether behavior is unintended. "Determinism" and "free
will" are arbitrary constructs. Those who posit absolute determinism can
always claim that there are external causes of behavior which have not yet
been found. Those who posit absolute free will can always claim that there
remain choices not yet found. In scientific parlance, theories of choice and
discretion remain trivial unless they include an empirical test of competing
claims.
The behavioral test of discretion can be justified on prudential as well as
empirical grounds. Insofar as actors manage to do what observer-scientists
do not expect, the actors provide the observers with options that the
observers can attempt to make plausible, practical, and rational. Explanations
of previously unanticipated action can justify options for those who previously
were locked into behaving predictably. The quest to understand unexplained
variances in behavior is a quest to expand knowledge of rational options that
similarly situated actors have. In my study of police crime reporting, police
reported offenses in response to just four of the more than two hundred calls
in which dispatchers named no offense. If we could make cognitive sense of
the four exceptions, we might give patrol officers the tools to approach a fifty-
fifty split between reporting and not reporting offenses in response to calls
with no offense named. The police would thereby demonstrate greater power
10. Beyleveld & Wiles, How to Retain Your Soul and Be a Political Deviant in DEVIANT INTERPRETA-
TIONS (1979), make an especially thoughtful case for the prosposition that choice can be deemed free
only when action can be shown to be rational within known environmental constraints. They argue
forcefully that inference of whether action is rational does not entail infinite regress. This author
disagrees. The range of controversy outlined in RATIONALITY (B. Wilson ed. 1979), illustrates why.
Determination of whether an action is rational entails selection from among several open sets: selec-
tion of relevant elements from the potentially infinite set of environmental constraints, selection of
elements of logic from a potentially infinite set of systems of logic, and choice of a stopping point in a
potentially infinite inquiry as to whether an actor's account of an action is true or false. Thus, as in
comparative research, the observer always has the potential of choosing between premises that lead
to defining another's action as either rational or irrational. See H. Pepinsky, Crime and Conflict: A
Study of Law and Society 8-10 (1976).
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of choice in reporting behavior and less constraint from the content of police
dispatchers' calls. If we believe in promoting free will or choice, we should be
happier as behavior becomes less predictable.
IV
DISCRETION AND JUSTICE
There is good discretion and bad discretion. If a police officer shot and
killed a person for making a raspberry at the officer, the killing would be
unexpected and hence discretionary. The killing would also constitute a
tragic injustice to practically all of us. But it is crucial to recognize that,
although discretion can be exercised unjustly, there can be no justice without
discretion.
Class (or racial) bias is the most prominent issue of (in)justice in crimino-
logical literature on police discretion. How is class bias demonstrated? It
appears as a systematic difference between the treatment that members of each
of two or more classes receive at the hands of police. In statistical terms, the
difference in treatment has to be "significant" in order to demonstrate bias,
and statistically significant differences-"explained variance" from null
hypoptheses-are by definition systematic. Class-biased police fit a mold;
they fail to exercise discretion to respond to citizens without reference to
class. As Aubert has put it, chance needs to be built into legal decisionmaking
before we can accept the decisions as just."
A graduate student once unwittingly demonstrated that discretion is only
half of the equation for justice. In her term paper, she criticized sexual dis-
parity in sentencing, and concluded that the quality of sentencing would be
improved if more women were sent to prison. She argued that such equality
was a fundamental right of women. The problem with her remedy, of course,
was that it would have represented a diminution in the power of an admittedly
oppressed class, rather than an increase in the accountability of officials to
women. The quest for women's rights before male-dominated officialdom
ought to be to make officials equally accountable to men and women, not
equally oppressive to men and women. To attain justice, accountability needs to be
added to discretion.
In the realm of policing, accountability means that those who police are
answerable to the interests of those who are policed. If young black men
could be shown that they were no more or less likely to be arrested than
others, and that police took as much account of the interests of the young
black men they did arrest as they took of others' interests, then those arrested
would be more likely to believe that the arrests were just.
11. Aubert, Chance in Social Affairs, 2 INQUIRY 1 (1959).
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V
CLASS INJUSTICE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
In recent years, there has been considerable debate over whether class bias
in policing is socially significant. For example, controlling for prior record
and offense charged, Terry12 and Thornberry13 found the same level of statis-
tical association between class and police decisions to take juveniles into cus-
tody (Kendall's tau - .04). Terry dismissed the association as insignificant; 14
Thornberry reported the association as a major finding.' 5 Statistical signifi-
cance of a result is one thing, and theoretical significance is another. Theoret-
ical significance is the point over which these two researchers diverge.
Robison was the first to find that American police discriminated against
youths "from the wrong side of the tracks."' 6 From what is now known, such
discrimination is initially minimal, especially as policing since the latter
1950's17 has grown reactive.18 It appears that the dramatic difference in rates
of crime and criminality are somehow attributable to differences in rates of
citizen complaints among neighborhoods.' 9
Consider, though, how these initial marginal differences are compounded.
The poor or minority youth is slightly more likely to be taken into formal
custody and to be referred to juvenile court for a first offense. 20 Then, the
offender becomes at risk (a) from other officials such as probation officers, (b)
from investigators who may focus suspicion on suspects because of prior
record, and (c) if apprehended again, from the whole criminal justice
system-including police, prosecutors, probation officers, referees, judges,
and parole officials, who will all discriminate, even to the extent of levying
heavier charges against those with prior records. 21 Thus, the slight initial dis-
crimination creates and extends prior records, and ultimately leads some
classes to have highly disproportionate representation among hardened
offenders. A study of reconviction by the British Home Office Statistical
Unit 22 dramatically illustrates the increasing liability of those who enter the
12. Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders, 58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 173
(1967).
13. Thornberry, Race, Socio-Economic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenilejustice System, 64J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1973).
14. TERRY, supra note 12, at 179-180.
15. THORNBERRY, supra note 13, at 97-98.
16. S. ROBISON, CAN DELINQUENCY BE MEASURED? (1936).
17. Selke & Pepinsky, The Politics of Police Reporting in Indianapolis, 1948-78, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
327 (1982).
18. A. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971). Nowadays, the police depend on rich and
poor complainants alike to tell them what to do, rather than relying heavily on their own initiative to
pick up people off the street.
19. R. CARR-HILL & N. STERN, CRIME, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL STATISTICS (1979).
20. See supra notes 12 and 13.
21. Studies like Terry's, supra note 13, reflect consensus among criminologists and criminal jus-
tice officials that prior record is a legitimate, "legal" basis for deciding that an instant offense is more
serious than it otherwise might be perceived to be.
22. THE BRITISH HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL UNIT, THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT (1964).
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criminal justice system: overall, 36.2% of first offenders are reconvicted
within five years, 57.5% of second offenders, and 77.2% of fifth offenders.
Once Robison had found discrimination in law enforcement, it fell to Tan-
nenbaum23 to explain how a little discrimination could go a long way. Practi-
cally all youths periodically do things that could be treated as delinquent. 24
The police catch only a few. Once a youth is caught and labelled (albeit more
gradually and softly than Tannenbaum might imply), his social identity is
transformed from that of a normal kid who occasionally misbehaves, to that of
a delinquent who only incidentally behaves normally. Even a slight class bias
in initially apprehending offenders can result ultimately in a highly select and
biased officially created sample of delinquents (and ultimately of adult
criminals). The prophecy that criminals are poor, young, and male ultimately
fulfills itself.
The insight that a little bias goes a long way has two major implications
that underlie inquiries into all criminal justice discretion. First, as Swigert and
Farrel 25 point out, it is absurd to presume that decisions are unbiased insofar
as they are accounted for by so-called "legal variables"-prior record and
offense charged. 26 Second, the greatest potential for the injustice of selective
enforcement lies not in individual police decisions, but in the cumulative
interaction of decisions among police, other criminal justice officials,
offenders, and the more or less tolerant civilian world around them. Thus,
Davis's premise-that primary concern should be reserved for the impact of
individual parties' bias on justice 27-rules out consideration of the more cru-
cial issues of discretion and justice.
There is overwhelming class bias, too, in the way police are mobilized.
This point can be illustrated with a politically implausible but legally reason-
able hypothetical case. Suppose that in an American city with team policing,
an officer assigned to cover a district totally at his discretion decides to leave
calls for service to back-up patrol. In lieu of routine patrol, the officer decides
to "patrol" to look for crime in a city hospital in the district. Suppose further
that under the public records law of the jurisdiction the hospital's records are
open to free inspection. Having had paramedical training, the officer decides
to look through surgery records for the prior year. The officer finds that one
general practitioner has performed an unusual number of hysterectomies.
The officer interviews a number of the patients to obtain their case histories,
and in one case, in which the patient died on the operating table, interviews
the family. The officer reviews the case histories in light of excerpts from
pathology texts and of consultation with doctors. Eventually, the officer
23. F. TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY (1938).
24. See Porterfield, Delinquency and Its Outcome in Court and College, 49 AM. J. Soc. 199 (1943). Self-
report studies since Porterfield's have consistently validated this finding.
25. Swigert & Farrell, Normal Homicides and the Law, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 16, 21-23 (1977).
26. Terry, supra note 12, is an early representative of the dominant perspective that the heavy
influence of seriousness of offense charged and prior record rules out class bias in criminal justice
decisionmaking.
27. K. DAVIS (1969), supra note 1, at 231.
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decides that ten of these operations, including the one in which the patient
died, were clearly unnecessary, and that the patients were not so informed.
Armed with affidavits from those interviewed and from consulting physicians,
the officer asks a judge to issue a warrant for the doctor's arrest on nine
counts of aggravated assault and one count of involuntary manslaughter.
28
The case illustrates several points. First, it is highly unusual, but legally
possible, for much of police patrol to be done in the suites instead of the
streets.29 Second, as Reiman points out, there is much reason to believe that
more death, injury, and property loss result from white-collar and organiza-
tional crime than from street crime, so that equal enforcement of the law
would require the police and others to report and act more against rich
people than poor people. 30 Third, given that the crimes of the rich are far
harder to detect and gather evidence against than those of the poor,3' it might
well take something like nine officers to discover and punish a rich person's
crime for every officer who brings a comparable street criminal to justice.
If, then, the rich are to be no more selected for non-enforcement of the
criminal law than the poor, the vast majority of the 400,000 sworn officers in
the United States would have to be sent to patrol the suites rather than to
patrol the streets, not only to give offenders their just desserts, but also to
protect victims. 3 2 Yet the reverse is true, as everyone knows, and the police
and the public largely take this highly selective allocation of patrol resources
for granted. 33
28. See Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. REV. 1 (1940), which long ago pointed out
that society is predisposed to see white-collar wrongs as civil or administrative rather than criminal.
Thus, a doctor whose unnecessary surgery results in injury or death might ordinarily be seen as
guilty of malpractice, but not of a crime. But consider: Harmful contact on one who has not con-
sented constitutes the common law crime of assault, and, at common law, an assault that results in
death constitutes manslaughter, if not murder. It is increasingly recognized that true consent
requires that a patient be fully informed about the risks and necessity of surgery. If, then, a doctor
fails to inform a patient that proposed surgery is unnecessary, the patient can be said not to have
given informed consent to the surgery; hence, the surgery can be said to constitute criminal assault.
29. The phrase "crime in the suites" is now commonly used by students of white-collar crime. It
is said to have been coined by Ralph Nader some years ago, although a reference to the first use of
the term has not been found.
30. J. REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON (1979).
31. See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, supra note 28.
32. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE U.S.: UNIFORM CRIME REP. (annual) con-
sistently reports about $6 million per year losses from property crime, and nearly 20,000 deaths from
murder and non-negligent manslaughter in a year. By contrast, the annual loss from auto repair
fraud alone is estimated at $20 billion (Jesilow, Deterring Automobile Repair Fraud: A Field Experi-
ment (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation)), while annual deaths from unnecessary surgery alone
are estimated to be 14,000 (see REIMAN, supra note 30). Reiman also reports annual deaths from
unsafe products and working conditions. It makes intuitive sense that the rich do far more unlawful
harm to victims than the poor. The rich have more power to do so, and can do so with relative
impunity.
33. M. BROGDEN, THE POLICE: AUTONOMY AND CONSENT (1982), illustrates a general phenom-
enon in a case study of policing in Liverpool. From the working classes to the highest social strata,
there is broad consensus that the major crime problem, upon which the police ought to concentrate,
is that posed by the chronically unemployed underclass, notably by young men in that group. Even
Karl Marx, in the COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848), lambasted "the 'dangerous class', the social scum,
that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of society." The myth that crime is associ-
ated with poverty is incredibly pervasive.
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Since we are unwarranted in believing that poverty has anything to do with
making some people less law-abiding than others, virtually every theory in the
criminological repertoire of what causes crime is ill founded.34 Whether bio-
logical (as in theories of heritability or malnutrition), psychological (as in the-
ories of ego development or moral development), or social (as in theories of
trouble in school or in the family, or of status attainment, or of ecology), prac-
tically all (even Marxist) theories rest on accepting a correlation between
crime and poverty. 35 Together, our theories and law enforcement predicated
upon those theories amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy in which we have a
huge social investment. As a consequence, to borrow the title of Reiman's
study, the rich get richer and the poor get prison. 36
VI
PRACTICAL IMPORT OF SELECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT
On the one hand, the overwhelming class bias in law enforcement makes it
overwhelmingly both unjust and ineffectual. Most harm comes from crimes
committed with impunity and, even where offenders are punished, that pun-
ishment costs taxpayers a great deal 37 with little protection or aid provided to
past or future victims.3 8
On the other hand, law enforcement is not realistically subject to being
made equitable or effectual, or of being abolished. Law enforcement is liter-
ally a political exercise-an exercise of power-and in that exercise those who
have more power as citizens are odds-on favorites to avoid the force of law.3 9
Even within the realm of controlling poor street criminals, and even
assuming the validity of theories by which retribution, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation through law enforcement are believed to prevent
crime, putting more resources into policing and criminal justice in a society
with a large crime problem simply makes the goals of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, or rehabilitation less attainable. 40 But, as with other processes
in living organisms, social processes are generally not reversible. 41 Although
more policing ultimately produces more crime and criminality, 42 withdrawal
of policing will ultimately achieve the same result. We have seen that disorder
breaks out during police strikes, 43 so that withdrawal of policing can be
34. See Sutherland, supra note 28.
35. H. PEPINSKY, supra note 10, at 108-10.
36. J. REIMAN, supra note 30.
37. According to the U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE, EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM (annual), about $100 per year per American is spent for police and corrections alone.
The courts and public lawyers are relatively cheap.
38. H. PEPINSKY, CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF CRIME
(1980), is an empirical and theoretical defense of this thesis.
39. Id. at 222-23.
40. Id.
41. G. BATESON, MIND AND NATURE: A NECESSARY UNITY (1979).
42. See H. PEPINSKY, supra note 38.
43. Hutchins, Comment on H. Pepinsky's Toward Diversion from Diversion from the Criminal
Justice System (1973) (unpublished paper presented at the Second Criminal Justice Conference at
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expected to engender a political will to strengthen policing more than ever.
For the time being, the optimal course would seem to be neither to add nor to
subtract police forces. The question remains whether inherently unjust and
ineffectual policing can be so directed as to encourage civilians gradually to
manage to do without law enforcement, in a way that lessens the injustice and
the harm of crime.
Contrary to the thrust of Davis's arguments, reduction of the most glaring injustice
requires that we INCREASE the discretion of the police NOT to enforce the law. This
entails establishing a system of regulation (1) to give greater discretion to police, and (2)
to make their discretionary action accountable to those most susceptible to having the law
enforced against them.
VII
INCREASING DISCRETION
"Theories of public law have tended to see discretion as a void surrounded
by legal rules and principles." 44 A corollary to this presumption is the belief
that when rules are promulgated and heeded, discretion is restricted. These
presumptions rest on faith rather than experience. Actually, public regulation
is a good way to increase official's discretion.
The rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona45 and their aftermath are a good
illustration. The Miranda Court was faced with two related problems in 1966.
The Court found first that police were systematically coercing confessions out
of suspects despite the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and
second that the police lacked guidance as to what safeguards against coercion
were required of them. The Court's solution to the first problem was to
extend the exclusionary rule to cover all coerced confessions. Its solution to
the second problem was to lay down a set of rules which would be conclu-
sively presumed to draw the line between the circumstances under which con-
fessions were or were not coerced.
It appears that the rules and the sanction had little impact either on rates
of confessions or on rates of conviction following arrests. 46 If the Court pre-
sumed that Miranda would shift the balance of police/suspect power in favor
of suspects, it was mistaken. More intriguing for our purposes, the Court was
also mistaken in believing it clarified for police what behavior was expected of
them. A perusal of Shepard's Citations shows that a mass of controversy rapidly
emerged on the meaning of every provision of the rules: this controversy
began to subside only at the close of the decade after the Miranda decision. In
a revealing critique of the exclusionary rules, the Chief and General Counsel
of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police argued in 1971 that "[p]olice
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, available at the Robert M. Hutchins Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California).
44. Prosser, The Politics of Discretion, in DISCRETION AND WELFARE 148 (1981).
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. Pepinsky, A Theory of Police Reaction to Miranda v. Arizona, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 379 (1970).
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officers want to be told what to do,"' 4 7 and criticized the rules for being
unclear.
The ambiguities posed by the Miranda rules are practically limitless. They
include: whether a suspect who responds to a police request to come to the
stationhouse to answer questions is "in custody"; whether the "right to
remain silent" extends to giving one's name and address; whether police are
required to inform a suspect that anything said "will" be used against him or
her in a court when in fact it may be used in mitigation; whether the "right to
have counsel present" covers every interval of interrogation; who decides
whether a suspect "cannot afford" to retain private counsel; whether a suspect
who has refused to be questioned on one matter may be approached on
another; whether a waiver of rights must be acknowledged in writing or on
tape; whether the warnings must be presented in writing rather than orally;
and whether a suspect is mentally competent to waive rights.
Over the years, in each jurisdiction, the police had a chance to work out
implicitly with prosecutors and judges what kinds of interrogation or reports
of interrogation would be tolerated. While the Miranda Court may have been
outraged at some of the practices recommended in interrogation manuals, in
the cases before it, it is likely that police practice had become remarkably uni-
form by 1966, so that in any situation, local officials at least could have
expected to agree on Whether an interrogation had gone beyond the bounds
of propriety. This kind of uniformity represents what Schelling describes as
tacit bargaining in games -theory,4 8 and what Sudnow describes as "normal
crimes" as between public defenders and prosecutors in plea bargaining.49 In
common parlance, we know such uniformity as customs.
Legislation or rule-making may have two outcomes. It may be perceived
as codifying custom, in which case it ratifies rather than changes behavior.
Ratification of custom, as in the achievement of consensual statements of
principle in Quaker meetings, can strengthen a group's sense of solidarity and
its sense of opposition to outsiders.5 0 On the other hand, if the aim of
rulemaking is to control or change behavior, then the more specific and
encompassing the rules, the more imposition of the rules breaks down
custom, that is, creates discretion. 5' The confusion created in the wake of
Miranda cannot simply be attributed to poor drafting. Quite the opposite is
true. If the rules had appeared from the outset to be ambiguous or obscure,
judges could have been expected to adopt the "good faith" test that has only
become prominent during the last several years. 5 2 The application of such a
test would forgive police officers for doing what arguably was legitimate and
47. Wilson & Alprin, Controlling Police Misconduct: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 36 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 488, 493 (1971).
48. T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
49. Sudnow, "Normal Crimes ". Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender's Office, 12
Soc. PROBS. 255 (1965).
50. L. COSER, FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956).
51. Pepinsky, Discretion and Crime Legislation, in DISCRETION AND CONTROL 27 (M. Evans ed. 1978).
52. E.g., United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
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fail to find that police had abused their discretion in conducting interroga-
tions. The tendency ofjudges would have been to presume that adherence to
preexisting custom was acceptable and reasonable.
Those who promulgate rules to curtail discretion are doomed to frustra-
tion. To be sure, new customs of interpreting rules will eventually take hold,
and this development will appear to indicate that conformity to the rules has
been established. But while customs of rule-abiding behavior can eventually
be inferred, the form of the customs will be indeterminate and unpredictable
at the time the rules are promulgated. The harder rulemakers try to dictate
the behavior of police officers, the more discretion the officers will have con-
cerning what adherence to the rules requires.
VIII
CHANNELING DISCRETION THROUGH AccOUNTABILITY
Political debate rages between advocates of police professionalism and
proponents of community responsiveness. 5 3 Where professionalism prevails,
police are more likely to trust one another as justly exercising individual dis-
cretion, while citizens who have the most contact with the police are likely to
perceive police discretion as threatening and unjust. Where community
responsiveness reigns, outside police are more likely to distrust the local
agency as corrupt. Two sets of citizen perspectives are possible within a com-
munity where responsiveness prevails. Either the citizens are split into fac-
tions that view the police as allies or enemies, in which case discretion is
curtailed and injustice is felt by citizens in the "enemy" faction, or citizens
help create rules that generate police discretion and stand a chance of being
united in the belief that their own policing is just-while believing policing in
other communities to be less so. In this last instance, the police can be
expected to exercise discretion with restraint and with reluctance to invoke
law. These three patterns of policing correspond roughly to Wilson's legal,
watchman, and service styles. 54
We have a great deal of experience in creating the legal and watchman
patterns of policing. Variants of centralized rulemaking or quasi-regulation of
policing across jurisdictions, such as commission reports, 55 standards, 56 and
common training programs, have taken policing a long way toward profes-
sionalism or legalism much as the creation of uniformed forces to protect
53. This debate is as strong in Britain as it is in the United States and, as Brodgen, supra note 33,
shows, has a long history. Most importantly for the argument presented here, the direction policing
takes rests crucially on organizational incentives. Incentives to professionalism emerge starkly in the
case study by Jones & Winkler, Beyond the Beat: The Facts About Policing in a Riotous City, 9J. L. & Soc.
103 (1982).
54. J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT
COMMUNITIES (1968).
55. E.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967).
56. E.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, THE
POLICE (1973).
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commercial interests in the nineteenth century went a long way toward estab-
lishing the watchman or the order-maintenance pattern. 57 By contrast, ser-
vice policing appears to have been largely isolated and peculiar to small and
wealthy communities in which the police obviously serve at the pleasure of
citizens of uniformly high class standing.5 8
Since law enforcement is inherently class-biased, the economic injustice of
law enforcement stands to be reduced only as police become more oriented
toward service other than law enforcement in rich and poor communities
alike. It has been said that law enforcement cannot be accomplished by with-
drawing police from communities that have come to depend on them, that
resultant predation and violence will only redouble community sentiment for
law and order. Going further, police initiatives are statistically incapable of
demonstrating either success in crime prevention or greater responsiveness to
the needs and complaints of victims of crime without sacrificing the one at the
expense of the other. Whatever initiative succeeds, an enduring reduction in
law enforcement class bias must come from the private community, and the
police must merely follow. 59
One procedure for making discretionary policing accountable to commu-
nities has been outlined elsewhere. 60 Most urban departments today have
community relations officers, who are largely relegated to giving invited talks.
Patrol district by patrol district (it is best to proceed slowly, and to experiment
freely and gradually), the community relations officer could try to locate
established groups that represent, as much as possible, the district and its
interests. For example, neighborhood associations in some cities (such as
Pittsburgh and Indianapolis) are well established and stand out as representa-
tive groups. The community relations officer could arrange that by rotation
(with backups provided for out of service officers), patrol officers in the dis-
trict would come in to negotiate mutually agreed-upon criteria for police per-
formance. In open meetings, the group and other community members
would tell the police what services they wanted, and the officers would tell the
citizens what they could and could not reasonably do. From the outset, it
would be established that the agenda for discussion included only what the
police could do for citizens and how police performance might be measured,
not what the community could do for the police (as by establishing block
57. See, e.g., E. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920 (1981).
58. See J. WILSON, supra note 54. Wealthier communities lend themselves to service-style
policing for several reasons. First, the young people of the communities come from families with too
much power for the police to succeed in treating young residents as ordinary criminals. Second, the
communities have the money and status to attract high-status recruits, as by requiring college
degrees. Third, wealthier communities have often proven willing to have experimental programs in
policing. For instance, while I was living in the Twin Cities area more than a decade ago, one sub-
urban department had its officers trained in Adlerian therapy and, much to the delight of the commu-
nity residents, offered confidential counseling for what elsewhere might have been deemed crime
problems between parents and adolescent children.
59. H. PEPINSKY, supra note 38, at 143-67.
60. An earlier version of the proposal outlined here appears in Pepinsky, Police Decision-Making,
in DECISION-MAKING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: REVIEWS AND ESSAYS (M. Gottfredson ed.
1975), and Pepinsky, Goal Definition for Police Patrolmen, in WORKING WITH POLICE AGENCIES 32 (1976).
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watches). 6' The aim would be to establish that citizens were initiating
responses from police, rather than the police initiating responses from
citizens.
Periodically, community representatives would propose concrete objec-
tives for policing and procedures for measuring police progress in meeting
those objectives. These objectives and procedures might have nothing to do
with traditional law enforcement. For instance, an objective might be for
officers to meet members of the community in routine visits, and the proce-
dure might be for members of the community to circulate monthly surveys
asking residents whether they had talked with individual officers whom they
could name during the period, how often, and concerning what. Community
members would volunteer their labor to conduct and tabulate the survey,
while the police department bore the expense of preparing the instrument.
Officers would be invited to see and discuss survey results, and to respond to
them orally or in writing.
Each objective and measure would be subject to approval by both commu-
nity members and the officers involved. The police could make counterpro-
posals. To establish mutual trust, it would be best to require complete
consensus on standards among officers (in consultation with superiors) and
the community members who attended meetings, before community repre-
sentatives and the head of the police department signed an agreement (sub-
ject to renegotiation) enacting the measure and its objectives. 62
The process of accumulating objectives and measures could be open-
ended. There would be no need to settle on a "full and final" set of objectives
and measures. Meetings and negotiations could be a continuous process
arranged between a community liaison representative and the district police
supervisor.
For their part, the police would undertake to include objectives, measures
and tabulations, and other analyses of results from the community in each
officer's personnel record. Once the process was underway, the police might
also undertake to limit information about the officer's performance included
in the file to (a) that provided by the community, and (b) information from the
police department only on disciplinary action and citizen complaints. 63 That
is, community indices of performance would supersede traditional perform-
ance measures such as arrest figures. When police boards were deciding
61. If communities are to take the initiative in managing conflict, community groups rather than
police must take the initiative in setting the agenda of police-community interaction. Having police
set the agenda is the fundamental flaw in most police-community relations efforts.
62. The requirement of police consent to objectives would also protect outsiders and minorities
within the community against community bigotry and intolerance. Since the police are held account-
able to larger constituencies (e.g., to the mayor of a city if the mayor appoints the chief, to the courts
for protection of citizens' civil rights, and to the media), they could be expected to moderate commu-
nity extremism. In anthropological terms, this would amount to using crosscutting ties to control
violence and conflict. See H. PEPINSKY, supra note 38, at 109-10.
63. Id. This limitation would also serve to protect outsiders and minorities against community
extremism. The inclusion of disciplinary action and citizen complaints would guard against police
violations of citizens' civil rights.
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issues like promotion, performance evaluations would be restricted to infor-
mation in the personnel file. It would thus be clear that community assess-
ment of policing carried serious weight in personnel actions.
This kind of approach to controlling policing would increase police discre-
tion both among districts and within districts. Discretion among districts
would be increased insofar as community objectives and measures provided
varyingcues as to community expectations. Discretion within communities
would be increased by emerging community standards of performance mea-
surement, just as the Miranda decision increased police discretion in interro-
gation across the country. Because the process of setting standards would be
open-ended, customs of policing would continuously be unsettled. It could
be expected that the ways that different officers approached various situations
within a district, with the objective of engendering the good will of community
members, would vary considerably and unpredictably. If the approach suc-
ceeded in establishing substantial bonds of trust between officers and commu-
nity members, discretion both in officer behavior and in community
evaluation would be equated with justice rather than seen as threatening. The
room for discretion would be seen as a challenge to the constructive resource-
fulness of all concerned in satisfying one another's concerns and interests.
Although some communities might call for crackdowns on "criminal ele-
ments" from time to time, especially initially, the approach should generally,
if only gradually, lead to a diminution of law enforcement in each district, for
two reasons. First, one gains the impression that police often arrest simply
for lack of an alternative. 64 A net effect of the approach would be for police to
get to know community members better without the urgency and unpleasant-
ness of having to resolve complaints of the moment.65 In encounters in which
the police confronted people they knew from other circumstances, they could
on the whole be expected to feel better equipped and more confident about
proposing idiosyncratic informal resolutions to disputes. 66
64. This problem is general to criminal justice officials. When I did public defender work as a
law student in the 1960's, I found sentencing judges most receptive to probationary alternatives such
as arrangement for private therapy. One judge expressed relief that I had presented him an option
to sending a sex offender to a notorious hospital for the criminally insane. Similarly, one police
department in my present community has embraced the opportunity to issue summonses for minor
offenses instead of going to the trouble of arresting and booking suspects. In part, arrests and other
sanctions are imposed simply because officials see no other way to handle situations.
65. The extent of pleasant, informal contact with citizens is something for which rural English
constables formerly were, M. CAIN, SOCIETY AND THE POLICEMAN'S ROLE (1973), and Japanese police
currently are, D. BAYLEY, FORCES OF ORDER: POLICE BEHAVIOR IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
(1976), renowned.
66. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & Soc. REV. 63, 87 (1974),
argues that American conflict managers lack the intimacy that helps mediators propose successful
resolution of conflicts in other societies. The mechanism of accountability proposed here is designed
in part to help create that intimacy. Citing societies in which resort to law enforcement is practically
nonexistent, one author infers that depth of personal knowledge of subjects, sharing power with
subjects, vulnerability to subjects, and mutual interdependence with subjects restrain punishment of
offenders. N. CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN (1981).
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Second, people complain to police for lack of an alternative. 67 As a secon-
dary effect of people working together on a common enterprise, especially
one implying that community representatives were competent to control
policing, community members (a) could be expected to gain confidence
enough to handle more disputes for themselves, and (b) would have identifi-
able community representatives other than the police to turn to for informal
mediation of disputes in time of need.68
A turning from law enforcement to informal handling of disputes within
communities implies a lessening of class bias. Most police districts are rela-
tively homogeneous in class, and victimization studies have found that most
street crime occurs between offenders and victims of like class standing. 69
Moreover, informal resolution of disputes through mediation tends to reinte-
grate offenders back into groups rather than labeling and further isolating
them in the manner of criminal justice processing. 70 Bias can occur in
informal dispute resolution, to be certain, such as between old and young or
men and women. But whatever class bias occurred in handling disputes infor-
mally within police districts could in no way reach the proportions of class
disparities in law enforcement. Although injustice in dispute handling is
potentially an infinite regress, it would regress downward to a lower level as
law enforcement waned. The net result would be that the generation of police
discretion would reduce the selective injustice of law enforcement.
Ix
CONCLUSION
Police discretion has been too glibly criticized in recent years. For one
thing, much of what is taken to be discretion is selective law enforcement, a
process which is nondiscretionary. For another, discretion is necessary to
reduce the injustice of law enforcement. Reducing the non-discretionary class
bias inherent in law enforcement entails reducing resort to law enforcement
itself, which entails generating greater discretion both among police districts
and agencies and among individual officers within districts.
Misleading premises about police discretion stem from uncritical adher-
ence to an Enlightenment idea of law and order. 71 Enlightenment misconcep-
tions run thus: The terms of a people's social contract among themselves
place limits on the exercise of state power over the people. To ensure that
people respect one another's liberty within the terms of the contract, officials
are to invoke legal sanction for misbehavior with perfect discipline-swiftly,
67. Pepinsky, Reliance on Formal Written Law, and Freedom and Social Control, in the United States and
the People's Republic of China, 26 BRIT. J. Soc. 330 (1975).
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., M. HINDELANG, M. GOTrFREDSON, &J. GARAFALO, VICTIMS OF PERSONAL CRIME: AN
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF PERSONAL VICTIMIZATION (1978).
70. Li, Law and Penology: Systems of Reform and Correction, in CHINA'S DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE
144 (Oksenberg ed. 1973).
71. In the realm of criminal law, the Enlightenment perspective was most clearly and cogently
argued by C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Ii. Paolucci trans. 1968).
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surely, and just severely enough to make the cost of breaking the law margin-
ally greater than the gains offenders seek. The official who acts within the
bounds of law will apply the law equally to friend, foe, and neutral stranger.
This government of laws and not of people preserves civil liberties and avoids
state despotism. By making law enforcement predictable, the government of
laws leaves people free to undertake private obligations freely and with the
security that reciprocity will be upheld. 72 The health and vigor of private
enterprise rests on the security that the rule of law will be upheld. Hence, not
only ciVil liberties but economic health and growth of peoples rest on mainte-
nance of law and order.
These premises entail two basic fallacies. One is that imposition of rules
makes behavior less discretionary, more predictable. As we have seen in the
case of the Miranda rules, imposition of rules instead breaks down custom and
introduces ambiguity into law enforcement. Application of rules requires (a)
that inferences be drawn from information received (e.g., as to whether com-
plainants are telling the truth), and (b) that the rules be interpreted in light of
unforeseeable ambiguities presented by idiosyncratic encounters. Extra-legal
interpretation of the meaning of rules in practice-personal evaluation of cir-
cumstances in light of law-is unavoidable. To take one example, there is no
such thing as an objective measure of whether penal law has been violated.
Trends in crime rates may be taken as an index of changes in perception of
how much law enforcement is called for, but not as an index of changing
probabilities of unlawful behavior per se, as increasing contradictions among
growing numbers of indices of crime and criminality have indicated. 73
The other fallacy is that more rigorous law enforcement can equalize
chances of enforcement across classes. The capacity of people to shape offi-
cials' evaluations-both of whether crimes have occurred and of the serious-
ness of crimes that have occurred-is inherently a matter of power. The odds
of immunity from law enforcement favor those with greater power, or higher
class standing, in any society. Equal chances of law enforcement would
require that far more official resources be devoted to scrutiny of the activities
of those at the top of the class hierarchy than of those at the bottom, a polit-
ical absurdity.74
The idea of full enforcement is even more chimerical. Self-report studies
of street crime, let alone studies of white-collar and organizational crime, indi-
cate that practically every American arguably commits crimes repeatedly. Full
enforcement would necessitate that just about all Americans of legal age,
72. This is the essence of organic solidarity, as described by E. DURKHEM, THE DIVISION OF
LABOR IN SOCIETY (Simpson trans. 1949).
73. Pepinsky, Toward a Science of Confinement, Out of the Fallacy of the Counterroll, in Criminology, in
RETHINKING CRIMINOLOGY 35, 38-40 (H. Pepinsky ed. 1982).
74. Contrary to the author's conclusions here, Braithwaite, Paradoxes of Class Bias in Criminal Jus-
tice, in RETHINKING CRIMINOLOGY 61 (H. Pepinsky ed. 1982), argues for reversing the bias. It strikes
me that the bias can be overcome only by political revolution, and then for no longer than a genera-
tion, as has been the case in China. Pepinsky, A Season of Disenchantment: Trends in ChineseJustice Recon-
sidered, 10 INT'LJ. Soc. & L. 277 (1982).
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including officials, be jailed or imprisoned periodically. In one sense, Davis is
right. Selective nonenforcement of the law is far greater than selective
enforcement. But this is not a matter of choice. The police are incapable of
more than skimming the surface of the pool of potential law violators. The
only way to reduce the odds that the rich get richer while the poor get prison
is to increase non-enforcement. As law enforcement approaches zero, so does
the disproportionate suffering of the poor at the hands of the police. 75 Just as
the growth of policing in recent years has taken discretion out of the hands of
the police,7 6 so attenuation of the injustice of law enforcement requires giving
greater discretion to the police not to enforce the law.
Ultimately, our misconception of issues of police discretion stems from an
equation of freedom of choice with individual autonomy. Choice is mistak-
enly presumed to be precluded where action is guided by the expectations of
others (as embodied, for example, in law); choice is presumed to be absolute
where expectations by others are uncodified.
Symbolic interactionists like Mead have made clear that action without ref-
erence to expectations of others is not action at all. 77 At best, it is asocial
behavior. 78 Once behavior becomes meaningful, it becomes social, and once
it becomes social, behavior is guided by perceptions of others' expectations.
Discretion or, in Davis's terms, the power to choose among courses of
action or inaction, is thus as fully influenced by people as is selective, or non-
discretionary, decisionmaking. Discretion is as much a product of social con-
trol as is selective decisionmaking. Generally speaking, insofar as control
operates by leaving rules alone, control creates the conditions for police to
settle into customs of enforcement and thus to lose discretion; insofar as we
introduce new regulation into policing, we create police discretion.
Non-discretionary or selective law enforcement is- inherently unjust. If we
can establish the kind of regulatory system that promotes trust and accounta-
bility between the police and their subjects, we can create the kind of discre-
tion that makes law enforcement less unjust. Yes, we ought to be
experimenting with regulating law enforcement in new ways, but no, we
should not doom ourselves to the frustration and injustice of trying to stamp
out police discretion in the process.
The exercise of discretion by public officers can be repressive; but once it
is conceded that discretion is a product of social control, it can be seen that
properly channeled discretion can also be liberating for all concerned. If dis-
cretion can produce misfortune, it can also be serendipitous. How can
policing be made more serendipitous? How can the game of police discretion
be turned from a zero-sum game (in which police win when offenders, and
75. Class disparity widens in the severity with which remaining offenders are punished, how-
ever. See H. PEPINSKY, supra note 38, at 85, 88.
76. See supra note 47.
77. G. MEAD, MIND, SELF & SOCIETY (C. Morris ed. 1934).
78. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 88-115 (T. Parsons ed.
1947).
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often victims, lose) into a mixed-sum game (in which complainants, suspects,
and police win together)? It is argued here that serendipitous law enforce-
ment rests on making police subject to regulation by the residents of the com-
munities they patrol. Properly constructed, this game requires the police to
try to exercise discretion in a way that serves the interests of those they
encounter-victims and offenders alike. It lodges in community residents the
primary responsibility for helping themselves to resolve their disputes short
of resort to law enforcement. The game offers community members better
living through creation of police discretion.
The work of Kenneth Culp Davis rests on a fallacy common to legal
theory: that those who honestly follow laws, rules, and regulations behave
like inanimate objects.79 Instead, if law, rules, and regulations need to be
imposed, it is because human subjects need a chance to hold police account-
able for their actions. Conflicting parties who use regulation have the poten-
tial of generating an infinite variety of "findings of fact" in any situation to
suit their interests, as the aftermath of Miranda indicates. Indeed, one of the
most highly prized skills for an American lawyer is to display ingenuity at
shaping "facts" of cases to suit clients' interests. 80
The greatest injustice of policing has lain not in encouraging discretion,
but in all other classes arriving at a premature consensus that chronically
unemployed underclass young men deserve the non-discretionary brunt of
law enforcement."' If the fundamental injustice of law enforcement gets
reduced, it will entail freeing the police from undue restrictions on their man-
agement of human conflict.
79. Sociologists of law have been as guilty as lawyers of committing this fallacy. The sociology
of knowledge of law and discretion would make a fascinating study in itself. I suspect that what has
happened is that sociologists of law have ceded a monopoly to lawyers of knowledge of how law
operates. Lawyers are presumed to be experts at using law to engineer change. If, therefore, sub-
jects of law behave in unexpected ways, it must be that the subjects are not following law, not that
lawyers misconstrue how law gets interpreted. Thus, sociologists of law assume that injustice is a
failure to follow or to have law, not a product of ignorance of sociology. If only social scientists could
presume themselves competent to question lawyers' myths about the rule of law, an understanding of
regulations would be considerably enhanced.
80: Rich clients, obviously, tend to get a greater share of the benefits of these skills than the
poor. Collectively, for instance, great skill and ingenuity have been displayed at assembling the facts
to show that, by law, the rich are far less crooked than the poor.
81. See supra note 33.
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